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EMPLOYMENT-PRECIPITATED HEART ATTACKS:
A FEW LEGAL ISSUES IN ESTABLISHING
COMPENSABILITY
John M. Gradwohl*
Hans J. Holtorf, Jr.**
Suppose that employee, E, is found by fellow employee, F,
at 12:15 p.m., slumped over his desk in physical circumstances
from which it is equally plausible that E had been eating his
lunch or working with ledgers.1 E was in obvious pain and told
F that the pain had started a few minutes earlier, just after
carrying the ledgers up two flights of stairs from the basement.
E was rushed to a hospital where he passed away at 3:30 p.m.
from what an autopsy indicated to be coronary thrombosis. E
told the attending physician that the pain had struck just after
carrying the ledgers up the stairs.
Further investigation revealed that carrying this sort of ledger
from the basement was a part of E's normal duties. There is no
direct evidence as to when or how the ledgers got from the base-
ment to E's desk. F can testify that E customarily ate a lunch
which he brought from home at his desk at 12:00 noon, although
he was not required to do so. At about 11:00 a.m. on the day of
his death, E told S, the plant supervisor for E's employer, a na-
tional concern, that he felt tired and intended to take a nap during
the noon hour and meet with S at 1:00 p.m. A few minutes before
noon, E told his secretary that he had already eaten lunch and
planned to get the ledgers from the basement and work on them
during the noon hour to prepare for the meeting with S. Portions
B.S., 1951, LL.B., 1953, University of Nebraska; LL.M., 1957, Harvard
Law School; Member, Nebraska Bar; Professor of Law, University
of Nebraska. Some of the research for this article was done by
Gregory C. Brady, a senior in the University of Nebraska College of
Law, under a grant from the University of Nebraska Research Council.
** A.B., 1937, LL.B., 1939, University of Nebraska; Member, Nebraska
Bar; Partner, Holtorf, Hansen & Kortum, Gering, Nebraska; contrib-
utor of the original Nebraska research to McN3McE, HEART DISEASE
AND THE LAw (1961).
1 Former students of Dean David Dow's practice course will recognize
the evidentiary issues raised by this hypothetical case as a collection
of some of the imponderables posed by him annually in that course.
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of this information can also be found in a company-required acci-
dent report prepared by F the afternoon of the accident and in the
doctor's and hospital's records.
II. COMPENSABILITY
A. IN GENERAL
These facts are intended to present a situation in which en-
titlement to workmen's compensation benefits depends upon es-
tablishing that the exertion from carrying the ledgers precipi-
tated the heart attack. The statute provides that "compensation
shall be paid in every case of injury or death caused by accident or
occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment .... -2 As amended in 1963, the related definitions in sec-
tion 48-151 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes provide:
(2) The word accident as used in this act shall, unless a different
meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean
an unexpected or unforeseen [event] injury happening suddenly
and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the
time objective symptoms of an injury. The claimant shall have
a burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that such unexpected or unforeseen injury was in fact caused by
the employment. There shall be no presumption from the mere
occurrence of such unexpected or unforeseen injury that the injury
was in fact caused by the employment.
(4) The terms injury and personal injuries shall mean only vio-
lence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or
infection as naturally results therefrom. The terms shall include
disablement resulting from occupational disease arising out of and
in the course of the employment in which the employee was en-
gaged and which was contracted in said employment. The terms
shall include an aggravation of a preexisting occupational disease,
the employer being liable only for the degree of aggravation of
the preexisting occupational disease. The terms shall not be con-
strued to include disability or death due to natural causes but
occurring while the employee is at work, nor to mean an injury,
disability or death that is the result of a natural progression of
any preexisting condition.8
An employee voluntarily performing his employment duties
on the employer's premises during a noon hour is covered during
that time.4 But it must also be established by a preponderance
2 NsEB. REV. STAT. § 48-109 (Reissue 1960).
3 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-151(2) and (4) (Supp. 1963) (Emphasis added.),
showing the new [in italics] and deleted [in brackets] language from
the 1963 amendments.
4 Tragas v. Cudahy Packing Co., 110 Neb. 329, 193 N.W. 742 (1923)(employee voluntarily sharpening chisel during noon hour "on his
own time").
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of the evidence that the employment, as distinguished from other
potential causes, precipitated, the injury or death. Under Ne-
braska law, an employee is entitled to compensation where a work-
injury combines with a pre-existing disease or other physical in-
firmity to produce disability or death. This is true even though
the disability or death would not have occurred from the employ-
ment except for the presence of the pre-existing infirmity.5
The ultimate element in claimant's case must be a qualified
medical opinion that facts admitted in evidence showing employ-
ment exertion were the "aggravating" or "precipitating" cause6
of E's death or of a condition which resulted in E's death. For
recovery to be allowed on the hypothetical facts set out above, it
would be critical that some evidence be introduced of employment
exertion of a sufficient degree to support a reliable medical
5 For a discussion of these rules, their development, and their relation-
ship to compensation for injuries by exertion or strain, see Gradwohl,
Nebraska Workmen's Compensation For Aggravation of Pre-Existing
Infirmities By Exertion or Strain, 41 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1961).
6 "Aggravation of disease" refers to "active suffering from a pre-existing
condition which was enhanced by an injury;" "precipitation" to "a
pre-existing condition which never manifested itself by overt symp-
toms." Gair, The Aggravation, or Precipitation, or Aggravation and
Precipitation, of Pre-Existing Condition by Trauma, Aggravation of
Pre-Existing Conditions: Medical Aspects of Heart Injury Cases 33(P.L.I. 1957): "In the case of precipitation, the 'condition' was below
water level, so to speak, and might never have emerged above it; but
in the case of the aggravation, of course, it was already observable."
Compensation is awarded in Nebraska for either "aggravation" or
"precipitation." See, e.g., Haskett v. National Biscuit Co., 177 Neb. 915,
920, 131 N.W.2d 597, 600-01 (1964): "Both Dr. Farrell and Dr. Jones
testified that the accident was the precipitating cause of the psychiatric
condition which resulted in the plaintiff's present disability. There
is evidence that the plaintiff was predisposed to develop such condi-
tion, and that the same injury to another person might not have re-
sulted in a similar disability. But that was no defense. Where an
accident combines with a preexisting condition to produce disability,
the injured workman may recover compensation." Turner v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 165 Neb. 338, 341, 85 N.W.2d 721, 724 (1957): "We have
held that when an employee meets with an accident which accelerates
or aggravates an existing impairment to a state of disability, such
disability not being the result of a natural progression of the impair-
ment, there may be an award of compensation therefor."; Gilcrest
Lumber Co. v. Rengler, 109 Neb. 246, 190 N.W. 578 (1922) (syllabus
by the court): It is sufficient to show that the injury and pre-existing
disease combined to produce disability, and not necessary to prove
that the injury accelerated or aggravated the disease, in order to satisfy
the requirement that the accident arose out of the employment."
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opinion on causation.7 In the absence of establishing both the
employment exertion and a medical opinion as to its causal rela-
tion to the death the claimant would lose the hypothetical case.8
In fact, no Nebraska Supreme Court decision to date has awarded
workmen's compensation benefits in a heart attack death case.9
7 There are two phases of this requirement: (1) The opinion of an
expert medical witness must be based upon facts admitted in evidence;
and (2) because a compensation award cannot rest upon surmise, con-
jecture or possibility, the expert's opinion must be "with reasonable
certainty" or "with reasonable medical certainty." See, e.g., Marasco
v. Fitzpatrick, 173 Neb. 272, 113 N.W.2d 112 (1962); Hamilton v. Hueb-
ner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945) (rejecting doctor's opinion
that "it could" or "it could be"); Whittington v. Nebraska Natural Gas
Co., 177 Neb. 264, 286, 128 N.W.2d 795, 808 (1964) (civil negligence
suit): "He was then asked, 'Can you say with reasonable medical
certainty that it would be possible that she would have the effects
which we described and which you have observed from the effects
of natural gas?' Objections were made to this for the reasons that
they should not deal in possibilities but with reasonable medical
certainty and that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.
Over repeated objections, Dr. Merrick was allowed to answer. 'I
think it would be reasonable to say that among the causes for these
symptoms the possibility of exposure to gas would have to be con-
sidered.' It seems apparent that the objections should have been
sustained and the answer excluded." For an interesting "Presentation
of Expert Medical Evidence in Court-Mock Trial of a Case of Trauma
and the Heart," see BEAR, LAw, MEDICINE, SCIENCE--AND JUSTICE, 75-
143 (1964).
S For Nebraska decisions before the 1963 amendments denying compen-
sation for heart injuries allegedly caused by employment, see Cochran
v. Bellevue Bridge Comm'n, 174 Neb. 761, 119 N.W.2d 292 (1963); Nel-
son v. Frenchman-Cambridge Irr. Dist., 168 Neb. 37, 95 N.W.2d
201 (1959); Eschenbrenner v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 165 Neb. 32,
84 N.W.2d 169 (1957); McCauley v. Harris, 164 Neb. 217, 82 N.W.2d 30
(1957); Ruderman v. Forman Bros., 157 Neb. 605, 60 N.W.2d 658 (1953);
Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945); Pixa v.
Grainger Bros. Co., 143 Neb. 922, 12 N.W.2d 74 (1943); Duncan v.
Weidman, 143 Neb. 864, 11 N.W.2d 537 (1943); Mook v. City of Lincoln,
143 Neb. 254, 9 N.W.2d 184 (1943); Brown v. City of Omaha, 141 Neb.
587, 4 N.W.2d 564 (1942); Rose v. City of Fairmont, 140 Neb. 550, 300
N.W. 574 (1941); Feeney v. City of Omaha, 140 Neb. 497, 300 N.W. 571
(1941); Shamp v. Landy Clark Co., 134 Neb. 73, 277 N.W. 802 (1938);
Brady v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 127 Neb. 786, 257 N.W. 66 (1934);
Gilkeson v. Northern Gas Engr Co., 127 Neb. 124, 254 N.W. 714 (1934);
Uribe v. Woods Bros. Constr. Co., 124 Neb. 243, 246 N.W. 233 (1933).
See also Marasco v. Fitzpatrick, 173 Neb. 272, 113 N.W.2d 112 (1962);
Mullen v. City of Hastings, 125 Neb. 172, 249 N.W. 560 (1934).
9 The Nebraska decisions in which surviving employees have recovered
compensation for heart injuries are: Knaggs v. City of Lexington,
171 Neb. 135, 105 N.W.2d 727 (1960); Anderson v. Cowger, 158 Neb. 772,
65 N.W.2d 51 (1954); Yakal v. Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co., 145
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B. USUAL VERSUS UNUSUAL EXERTION IN HEART CASES
The 1963 amendments to the workmen's compensation law
were intended to remove the judicial interpretation of the "acci-
dent" definition requiring some sort of a cause external to the
workman's body-a slip, trip, or fall, or some form of exertion
which was unusual to his ordinary work duties. Under the
amendment, employees are entitled to compensation for disability
or death caused by exertion or strain in performing any of the
duties of their employment, usual or unusual.'0 Nevertheless, it
has not been completely clear whether a claimant 'would be re-
quired in some situations to show unusual exertion as an element
of "arising out of and in the course of employment" or "in fact
caused by the employment."" No reason appears for differen-
tiating heart cases from any other injuries by exertion or strain,
except perhaps, that medical knowledge of the causes of heart
malfunctions and the testimony based thereon, may be somewhat
less certain at the present time.'2
Neb. 365, 16 N.W.2d 531 (1944); Schirmer v. Cedar County Farmers
Tel. Co., 139 Neb. 182, 296 N.W. 875 (1941). In other cases, compen-
sation has been awarded for heart injury as a part of some other
disability. See, e.g., Marler v. Grainger Bros., 123 Neb. 517, 243 N.W.
622 (1932) (increased heart rate and dizziness as a part of post trau-
matic neurosis).
10 For a general discussion of the scope and effect of the 196.3 amendments,
see Gradwohl, Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis of Nebraska's
Revised "Accident" Requirement, 43 NEB. L. Rav. 27 (1963).
"1 Id. at 31-2 (citing Florida decisions under the statute from which the
original 1963 legislative draft [later amended in this respect] was
copied). In view of the decision in Campbell v. City of North Platte,
178 Neb. 244, 132 N.W.2d 876 (1965) (discussed infra), however, the
likelihood that the Nebraska court will take this approach seems
slight.
12 The Minnesota court appears to have determined this issue realistically
in a series of cases stemming principally from Golob v. Buckingham
Hotel, 244 Minn. 301, 304, 69 N.W.2d 636, 639 (1955): "There is much
of interest from a medical viewpoint in the record and briefs. It
would be of no value to set forth the opposing views of the medical
experts. It is sufficient to say that it is apparent that in this field
of medicine, as well as others, even those specializing in the field
do not agree on the question of whether trauma or exertion can cause
the formation of a blood clot and the resulting thrombosis. It is possi-
ble that part of the difficulty in understanding the divergence of
views of doctors comes about by virtue of the difference in approach
to the question of causation by members of the medical and legal
professions. However that may be, until the time comes when medical
knowledge has progressed to such a point that experts in the field
of medicine can agree, causal relation in determining compensable
injury or disease will have to remain in the province of the trier of
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1. Legislative development
The context of the 1963 legislative amendments indicates
clearly that there should be no unusual exertion test under any
section of the workmen's compensation law, applicable to all or
any exertion cases. Addition of the language relating to proving
employment cause as a part of the "accident" definition has statu-
torily fused the "by accident" and "arising out of and in the course
of employment" requirements. Artistically, the "in fact caused by
the employment" sentences might better appear either as a sepa-
rate section pertaining to burden of proof or as a part of the defini-
tion of "arising out of and in the course of employment." The
Judiciary Committee, which had previously split three-to-three
(with one senator not voting) on the bill as introduced, voted the
bill to the floor of the Legislature only after addition of the lan-
guage relating to employment-cause. 13 The predominant intent of
the Committee to eliminate the unusual exertion test is clear.' 4
fact." See Rosvold v. Independent Consol. School Dist., 251 Minn.
297, 300-01, 87 N.W.2d 646, 649 (1958): "So we have here a situation
which arises often in compensation cases. An employee dies from
some disease, such as cancer, stroke, coronary thrombosis, as here, or
some other disease, having had experiences in the course of his work
which it is claimed were the cause of his death. Competent medical
experts are called in to give their opinions as to whether there is
causal connection between these work experiences and his death.
Those called by petitioner will testify that there is such causal connec-
tion, while those called by the employer will say that there is no such
connection. It does not follow that their opinions are colored or
influenced by reason of the fact that they are called by the one side
or the other. In many fields of medicine there is still much room for
disagreement among experts, but the number of such fields is becoming
less and less. As medical science progresses, it is expected that more
and more conflicts will be resolved. But while these disagreements
or conflicts are still going on, finders of fact and courts generally must
make decisions .... The determination of the question of causation
on conflicting expert testimony is no different than the determination
of any other question of fact where witnesses disagree." Cf. Campbell
v. City of North Platte, 178 Neb. 244, 247, 132 N.W.2d 876, 878 (1965)(opinion of Judge Smith): "No complaint is made that a direct causal
relationship in medicine will not permit an inference which meets this
standard. To refine further is to mistake one science for another.
When the question is medical, medicine must give us the answer."
1s Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary on L.B. 497, 73d Neb.
Leg. Sess. (April 17, 1963, April 22, 1963, and May 8, 1963).
14 Statement of Judiciary Committee on L.B. 497, 73d Neb. Leg. Sess.
(May 22, 1963): "For the last two decades the Supreme Court has
given a narrow interpretation of the type of injury which occurs from
exertion on the part of the employee while doing work demanded by
his employment. At one time the Nebraska court favored the more
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It is a safe assumption that the statutory addition of the last two
sentences in section 48-151(2) and the last clause in section 48-151
(4) was intended to assure that those rules for proving employ-
ment-connection, then clearly stated in many judicial opinions,
would remain unchanged. That several technically separate re-
quirements were thrown together in the process indicates a clear
substantive as well as physical fusion of the requirements, at
least with respect to employment exertion or strain. This result
seems wholly proper since both requirements serve the same un-
derlying purpose of requiring a claimant to locate with some de-
gree of precision the time and place within the employment from
which the injury was derived.
2. Judicial Analogy
It is submitted that the recent firemen's pension decision in
Campbell v. City of North Platte15 provides a convincing prece-
dent that unusual exertion is not, and should not be, required to
establish employment-connection in workmen's compensation heart
cases. In most respects, Campbell cannot be taken as a forecast of
the outcome of future workmen's compensation cases. Even as a
firemen's pension precedent, the decision should be carefully
limited to its facts.
On the issue of legal causation, however, the Campbell case
stands squarely for the proposition that it is not necessary to
show unusual employment exertion to prove a work-caused heart
injury. The majority termed the issue "a fact question whether
the disease was contracted in the line of duty." But certainly
the majority opinion, and probably the dissenting opinion as well,
operated on the clear assumption that the performance of ordi-
nary work duties, without a showing of extraordinary exertion
or stress beyond the normal duties, could be the cause in fact of
a heart attack.
The workmen's compensation "accident" definition has the
added requirements of "suddenness" and "objective symptoms"
not found in the firemen's pension law. These requirements
liberal rule which is law in a great majority of the other states; but
in the last two decades our Supreme Court has construed, generally,
that inner bodily injuries caused by exertion are not compensable
unless the employee obtains such in connection with a slip, trip or
fall. This narrow court interpretation does not do justice in many
cases and is not in harmony with the majority of opinions in other
states under workmen's compensation law."
15 178 Neb. 244, 132 N.W.2d 876 (1965).
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will be extremely significant in trials of compensation cases where
the injury or death is alleged to have resulted from exertion or
strain. Although the burden of proving these two elements will
result in significant hurdles for a claimant to master, once over
them, the underlying legal requirement of exertion or strain in
the two systems are identical.
The applicable fireman's pension statute provided benefits for
the widow or minor children "in case of the death, while in the
line of duty . .. or in case death is caused by or is the result of
injuries received while in the line of duty."'1 6 Mr. Campbell died
on March 11, 1963, of coronary artery disease at 56 years of age.
He had been a paid fireman since 1948, serving as assistant chief
from 1951 through 1962. He had passed physical examinations in
1948, 1951, and 1955.
The Campbell opinion reports that "in the fall of 1959 and
later he complained of severe chest pain and pressure in his
throat occurring mostly upon his return to the fire station from a
call. In December, 1961, a physician diagnosed coronary arterio-
sclerosis.' 1 7  The precise nature of these findings are not re-
ported. Apparently, his condition was not severe since there is
no indication that his fire fighting duties were curtailed at this
time or that his secondary part-time job for land surveyors was
limited.'8
The final sequence of events occurred as follows:
Campbell worked for a land surveyor on July 5 and 6, 1962. The
following day-his third consecutive day off duty and the fifteenth
day since his last call-symptoms of a coronary occlusion hospital-
ized him. When he returned to duty in October, he was assigned
tasks limited to the fire station. On March 11, 1963, he worked at
the station from 2 to 4 p.m., and died at home at 9:30 p.m.19
16 NEB. REV. STAT. § 35-202 (Reissue 1960). Judge Smith's majority
opinion in Campbell quoted only the phrase "death is caused by or
is the result of injuries received while in the line of duty." Judge
Spencer's dissenting opinion charged that the majority opinion changed
the first portion of the statute to read "In case of death while in the
employ."
17 178 Neb. 244, 246, 132 N.W.2d 876, 878 (1965).
18 It should be noted that full-time paid firemen in Nebraska have tra-
ditionally worked on alternate twenty-four hour schedules, with addi-
tional work days off periodically. Most paid firemen have found it
economically necessary to secure secondary employment on these off-
days. Mr. Campbell had worked from one or two to eight hours per
day at this part-time job for several years.
19 178 Neb. 244, 246, 132 N.W.2d 876, 878.
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The only expert witnesses were two general practitioners and
an internist called by the plaintiff widow. The internist "found
on hypothesis a direct causal relation between duty and disease."
The jury verdict was undoubtedly produced by this expert medi-
cal testimony. The defendant city called no additional -medical
experts.
In a compensation case, the plaintiff's evidence would addi-
tionally have needed to establish that the heart condition produc-
ing death was caused "suddenly and violently"20 by the employ-
ment and that there were "at the time objective symptoms of an
injury." These elements of compensation proof would undoubt-
edly have been lacking in Mr. Campbell's situation.
It should not be inferred that in a workmen's compensation
case, the claimant will be put to any greater burden of proof or
persuasion than "a preponderance of the evidence" as in jury
cases under the firemen's pension law. But the suddenness and
objective symptoms requirements mean that, in those respects, the
compensation statutes have drawn a tighter legal requirement
for employment-causation than have the firemen's pension stat-
utes.
The supreme court majority decision in Campbell did no more
than find the evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict under
traditional- concepts of appellate review. The evidence contained
a medical opinion that there was a direct causal relation between
Mr. Campbell's fire fighting duties and his fatal heart attack.
Applying the rule that an expert's opinion, if not impeached, is
sufficient to sustain a jury verdict, the internist's opinion of the
20 It would seem that any heart attack "happening suddenly" would
automatically be "violently" as used in this phrase. At the time of
the 1963 amendments, there had been no substantial judicial develop-
ment of the term "violently" other than as a part of the entire phrase
intended to require a degree of suddenness which would fix the time
and place of the alleged disability or death within the employment.
The 1963 amendments were intended to eliminate the means by which
disability or death was brought about as a requirement for compensa-
bility. For that reason, the phrase "happening suddenly and violently"
should continue to be applied as an entity relating to speed, without
imposing an additional requirement of physical or external violence
or violent means. But cf. Shamp v. Landy Clark Co., 134 Neb. 73, 80,
277 N.W. 802, 806 (1938) (unwitnessed death of coal hauler found
dead crumpled over the heap of coal in his truck): "The death of
Ole Shamp was unsuspected and unforseen and happened suddenly,
but there is a lack of evidence from which it may properly be inferred
that there was any violence, within the meaning of the law, connected
with the death."
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effect of "emotional stress, emotional-physical strain, and toxic
effects" properly carried the case to the jury."'
The four judge supreme court majority opinion did not pass
fully on the medical issues in the Campbell case, but merely
affirmed a jury verdict resulting from the testimony of the in-
ternist. Three judges dissented on the basis that there was not
enough evidence that the stress of fire fighting produced the heart
condition causing death to submit the case to the jury since the
internist had conceded that other activities, such as those engaged
in by surveyors, physicians, attorneys, or businessmen, might be
equally strenuous in this regard.
Had the Campbell case been one of de novo review upon the
record of a workmen's compensation award,22 the four majority
members of the court might well have evaluated the medical evi-
dence contained in the record in favor of the defendant. For the
same reasons, at the district court or compensation court trial of
the same compensation case without a jury, the trial judges
might have found against employment-cause on this medical evi-
dence. This limitation in the Campbell decision, if any, in this
respect, is an inherent aspect of resolving complex medical factual
issues by jury trial in an adversary system.
By similar reasoning, it seems quite probable that the dis-
senting judges in Campbell will not impose an unusual exertion
requirement in a workmen's compensation heart case. Judge
Spencer's dissenting opinion is focused on the proposition that Mr.
Campbell's fire fighting duties were not shown to have caused Mr.
Campbell's death. The opinion contends that the statute has been
construed by the majority to read "while in the employ" rather
than "while in the line of duty." The reasons assigned are that
the evidence did not establish an immediate disablement because
of the extended time interval and the occurrence while sitting in
a living room at home; that the evidence did not differentiate fire
fighting from the moonlighting as a potential cause of the fatal
heart attack; and that the evidence did not differentiate fire fight-
21 Apart from the tactical risk before the jury, the fact that defendant
offered no independent medical evidence would not affect this result.
In both of the cases cited for this proposition in the Supreme Court
majority opinion, the defendant had introduced medical evidence. See
Long v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 145 Neb. 623, 17 N.W.2d 675 (1945);
McNaught v. New York Life Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 694, 18 N.W.2d 56 (1945).
See also Hassmann v. City of Bloomfield, 146 Neb. 608, 20 N.W.2d 592
(1945).
22 NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 48-185(3) (Reissue 1960).
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Lug from -ordinary life stresses as a potential cause of the fatal
heart attack.
Note that Judge Spencer's reasons are not concerned with
whether or not the death arose from the ordinary stresses of
fire fighting. It is not contended that to establish fire fighting as
a potential cause of death unusual exertion within fire fighting
must be shown. The factual concern involved differentiating the
ordinary stresses of fire fighting from non-fire fighting stresses.
Further, a potential workmen's compensation claimant would
need to meet the "happening suddenly" and "producing at the
time objective symptoms of an injury" requirements. The sort of
evidence involved in these issues might well have filled the void
the dissenting judges found in Campbell.
In this regard, the dissenting opinion distinguished Elliott v.
City of Omaha,23 relied upon by the majority, on the basis that in
Elliott there is stronger evidence that the employee contracted
pneumonia at work and then died from that disease. Mr. Camp-
bell's 1962 heart attack occurred on his third consecutive day off,
fifteen days after his * last fire call. It is significant, at least in-
ferentially, to the majority in Campbell that the 1959 symptoms
occurred at work and that the internist's opinion linked the
stresses of fire fighting, whenever they may have occurred, to the
resulting cause of death.
In Elliott, the jury had found that a fireman contracted pneu-
monia in the line of duty from which he died ten days later.
Judge Day's supreme court opinion held that the phrase "injuries
received while in the line of duty" includes a disease contracted in
the line of duty. The opinion states (and this is the item re-
ported in the annotation under section 35-202 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes):
Cases arising under compensation acts are not very helpful to
the present discussion, because in most, if not all, of them com-
pensation is allowed only for injuries by accident, arising out of
and in the course of the employment. It will be readily conceded
that the phrase, 'injuries received while in the line of duty,' has a
much broader meaning than the language generally used in com-
pensation acts.24
Judge Day meant this language to support the conclusion
that a disease constituted an "injury" under the fireman's pension
act although it would not have been an "accident" within the
23 109 Neb. 478, 191 N.W. 653 (1922).
24 Id. at 480-1, 191 N.W. at 653-54.
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compensation law. The first occupational disease coverage was
not added to the workmen's compensation law until 1937. For
that reason, Judge Day's opinion properly concluded that although
it would not be covered by the workmen's compensation statutes,
the fireman's pension law "includes any hurtful effect which a
fireman may receive in the line of duty."
But at the time of the Elliott opinion, the Nebraska court had
already decided in favor of the compensability of injuries from
exertion under the workmen's compensation statute. In Manning
v. Pomerene,25 compensation was allowed for the death of an em-
ployee from the bursting of blood vessels in the employee's brain
or stomach as he pushed two "I" beams in the ordinary perform-
ance of his duties. The workmen's compensation unusual exertion
requirement was brought into existence by the court more than
ten years after Elliott; nothing prior to Elliott remotely suggests
any such workmen's compensation requirement. Thus, the reason-
ing in Elliott would wholly support the proposed analogy on em-
ployment-cause from the Campbell case to injuries by exertion or
strain under the workmen's compensation law.
III. RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. IN GENERAL
The rules of evidence which will be applied to a trial of the
hypothetical facts set out above are the normal rules of evidence
applicable to district court equity trials.26  Unlike some other
states, Nebraska follows no special evidentiary rules in work-
men's compensation cases.2 7  Although the Workmen's Compen-
25 101 Neb. 127, 162 N.W. 492 (1917). See Derr v. Kirkpatrick, 106 Neb.
403, 184 N.W. 91 (1921).
26 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-181 (Reissue 1960).
27 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 332, 19 N.W.2d 552, 559
(1945): "We are unwilling to accept the doctrine, stated in the Minne-
sota and Pennsylvania cases, that evidence which would be incompetent
as hearsay in other cases should be considered competent in cases for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. So to hold
would tend to change the liability of the employer from liability for
injuries or death arising out of and in the course of the employment
to the liability of an insurer of the well being of his employee. The
compensation act does not put that burden upon the employer." Muff
v. Brainard, 150 Neb. 650, 652-53, 35 N.W.2d 597, 600 (1949): "Hearsay
evidence is not admissible in a workmen's compensation case any more
than in any other type of case. The foregoing rule is no different
because the death of the employee alleged to have suffered a com-
pensable accident has made it difficult of proof." For a survey of the
special evidentiary rules applied in other states, see 2 LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 79 (1961).
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sation Court has some power to relax the usual common law or
statutory rules of evidence, 28 it has done so only with respect to
the manner of presenting medical evidence on original hearings
before a single judge of the court.29
B. SPONTANEOUS DECLARATIONS AND RES GESTAE
There is an abundance of Nebraska decisions and judicial state-
ments concerning spontaneous declarations and res gestae. How-
ever variously stated,30 the requirements are substantially those
classified as spontaneous exclamations by Wigmore:
(a) Nature of the occason. There must be some occurrence,
startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render
the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting....
(b) Time of the utterance. The utterance must have been before
there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the
nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the re-
flective powers to be yet in abeyance....
(c) Subject of the utterance. The utterance must relate to the
circumstances of the occurrence preceding it....si
Several Nebraska workmen's compensation cases are quite
similar to the hypothetical facts. From these cases, it seems that
28 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-168 (Reissue 1960). The supreme court's require-
ment that the general rules of evidence apply to compensation cases
has been established in appeals from trials de novo in a district court
and has not dealt specifically with the Workmen's Compensation
Court's power under § 48-168.
29 NEB. WoimnmN's Cozn,. CT. R. XV.
30 See, e.g., Gain v. Drennen, 160 Neb. 263, 267-68, 69 N.W.2d 916, 919
(1955): "There is no hard and fast rule for demarcation between that
which is and that which is not res gestae but this court has said that
a declaration, to be competent evidence as part of the res gestae, must
be made at such time and under such circumstances as to raise the
presumption that it was the unpremeditated and spontaneous explana-
tion of the matter about which made." Tongue v. Perrigo, 130 Neb.
564, 571, 265 N.W. 737, 740 (1942): "The doctrine of res gestae is some-
what obscure, but expressed in our language, and not in the abbre-
viated Latin phrase, its application to the admissibility of statements
depends upon their being spontaneous and impulsive; the material
inquiry being whether the statements offered as evidence were made
at a time and under such circumstances as to induce the belief that
they were not the result of reflection and premeditation." See Calla-
han v. Prewitt, 141 Neb. 243, 3 N.W.2d 435 (1942); Roh v. Opocensky,
126 Neb. 518, 253 N.W. 680 (1934).
51 6 WIOPMO, Evm Eca § 1750 (3d ed. 1940). This definition has been
paraphrased in'Nebraska decisions. See Reizenstein v. State, 165 Neb.
865, 87 N.W.2d 560 (1958); Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.
2d 552 (1945).
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some of E's statements are within the scope of this rule, but that
introduction of the testimony would depend upon further develop-
ment of the circumstances in which the statements were made,
especially E's probable condition throughout the time interval
between event and declaration.
The leading workmen's compensation case appears to be
Hamilton v. Huebner.32 A forty-five year old filling station opera-
tor sustained a heart attack after attempting to start an engine
with a rope. Thirty to sixty minutes after the initial pulling,
decedent told a fellow employee he had not been able to start
the engine and that he had a severe pain in his chest. A few
minutes later, he said the same thing to a tire company repre-
sentative. He did not tell of any fall, ask for assistance, or appear
to be extremely ill. Sometime within the next hour, he walked to
his home less than a block away and for the first time in response
to his wife's question as to cause, added that the starter rope had
broken and he had fallen. At that time he was excited and in pain
and showed signs of physical distress. Fifteen or twenty minutes
later, he told his doctor that he had fallen and suffered an acute
pain very shortly thereafter. Because the usual exertion rules
would have barred compensation for injuries from the perform-
ance of normal duties, claimant's case depended upon establishing
that the decedent had fallen.
The court noted in Hamilton that "[d] ue to the variable cir-
cumstances arising in each case, any attempt to base a decision
on fact precedent is largely futile."3 3 Nevertheless, the rejection in
Hamilton of the testimony as to the decedent's post injury state-
ments appears to represent a sound application of the spontane-
ous declaration rules under the classic statements: There was no
showing that the statements to the fellow employee or tire sales-
man were made as a result of any nervous excitement. The
statements to the wife and doctor, while made under what might
be stress and pain, were made only after time to reflect, uttered
in circumstances of reflection, and probably did not relate to the
circumstance preceding them in point of time. It is possible that
since the legislative elimination of the usual exertion rules in
1963, a claimant in a similar case could sustain a burden of proof
of employment-connection upon a fuller development of other
facts relating to his attempts to start the engine. But his after-
the-event statements which were previously excluded would also
be excluded today.
32 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945).
33 Id. at 329, 19 N.W.2d at 557.
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Other Nebraska workmen's compensation cases have applied
Wigmore's statement paraphrased in Hamilton that "the statements
need not be strictly contemporaneous with the exciting cause;
they may be subsequent to it, provided there has not been time
for the exciting influence to lose its sway and to be dissipated. '3 4
In Ridenour v. Lewis,35 the court admitted oral statements made
ten to thirty minutes after an attack by robbers. Perry v. Johnson
Fruit Co.3 6 admitted decedent's statements made upon reviving in
a hospital some fifteen minutes after the accident. But in Milton
v. City of Gordon,37 the casual statement of an employee twenty-
five or thirty minutes after the alleged employment-caused injury
was not admissible. The effect of these factual determinations is
likely to be minimal. Each case will depend upon an application
of the general rules to the specific facts without substantial factual
analogy.
Apart from the spontaneous declaration rule, employee state-
ments after the injury as to its cause are inadmissible hearsay
narratives of past events. This covers written reports by the em-
ployee to the employer as well as his oral statements.3 8
The exceptions to the spontaneous declarations rule are not
significant in the hypothetical situation. A doctor is permitted to
testify as to the past history given him by the patient, including
the cause of the harm. The testimony is admissible, however, only
on the issue of diagnosis and treatment, and is not evidence on
causation.3 9 To be admissible on the cause issue, the medical opin-
ion must rest on facts otherwise admitted in evidence. Subse-
quent statements to the decedent's wife have been admitted in
rebuttal to defendant's position that no claim of employment-con-
nection was made at the time of the alleged injury, although the
testimony would not have been received on the case in chief.40
Similarly, direct evidence may open up the subject for cross-
34 6 WGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 31, § 1750.
85 121 Neb. 823, 238 N.W. 745 (1931).
36 123 Neb. 558, 243 N.W. 655 (1932).
87 129 Neb. 888, 263 N.W. 483 (1935).
38 See Muff v. Brainard, 150 Neb. 650, 35 N.W.2d 597 (1949). The briefs
of the parties make clear that the decedent prepared a written, signed
accident report.
39 Fries v. Goldsby, 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d 171 (1956). See Gotfrey v.
Sakurada, 169 Neb. 879, 101 N.W.2d 470 (1960).
40 McCoy. v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 156 Neb. 95, 102-03, 54 N.W.2d
373, 378 (1952).
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C. THE "STATE o MIND" EXCEPTION
The Nebraska decisions have not dealt definitively with the
so-called "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule. Some
courts have ruled that statements evidencing a present state of
mind or intention of the declarant are not hearsay when testified
to by another and can be offered on the issue of the declarant's
subsequent conduct where relevant.
42
Nebraska appears to have applied these rules in a number of
criminal cases. For example, the defendant in a murder case
was permitted to introduce evidence of his deceased wife's stated
intention within three weeks of her death to commit suicide in
support of his defense that death occurred by suicide.43 Applying
the "state of mind" exception to the hypothetical facts, E's secre-
tary would be permitted to testify as to E's statements that he in-
tended to carry the books and S could testify (if not precluded by
the dead man's statute) as to E's statements that he intended to
eat lunch at 12:00. The weight to be given this evidence would
depend to a large degree, however, upon the surrounding circum-
stances. In any event, the secretary would not be permitted to
testify concerning E's statements of having eaten lunch previously,
as this would relate to a past fact and not to the existing state of
E's mind.
41 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1215 (Reissue 1964); Sweeney v. Midwest Life
Ins. Co., 129 Neb. 521, 262 N.W. 47 (1935).
42 6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 31, § 1725; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 270
(1954).
43 Sutter v. State, 102 Neb. 321, 167 N.W. 64 (1918). Also, a defendant
might introduce evidence of "uncommunicated threats" by the deceased
to illustrate or explain some act of the deceased, although the evidence
is not admissible unless other evidence has first been introduced in
support of self-defense. See Binfield v. State, 15 Neb. 484, 19 N.W.
607 (1884). The state has been permitted to introduce evidence,
where relevant, in a criminal prosecution concerning an intention of
a deceased person. See, e.g., Fields v. State, 107 Neb. 91, 185 N.W. 400
(1921). In dictum, the court has stated the general rule, citing, among
other authorities, the leading decision in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill-
mon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892); Gering v. School Dist., 76 Neb. 219, 227-28,
107 N.W. 250, 254 (1906). For the effect of analogous evidence ad-
mitted in two will contest cases, compare Muse v. Stewart, 173 Neb..
521, 113 N-W.2d 644 (1962), with Hober v. McArdle, 173 Neb. 510, 113
N.W.2d 625 (1962).
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D. "HABIT"
Unwitnessed employee death cases provide a potential source
for determining whether the habits or customs of an individual
can, where relevant, be introduced as evidence that he did or did
not do certain acts on the questioned occasion. The process of
industrialization often encourages employers to adopt standard
operating procedures and employees to become creatures of habit
while at work. Consistent business practices have received favor-
able evidentiary treatment in past cases.44
Where witnesses to the act in question are present, evidence
of habit is apparently inadmissible in Nebraska.45 But the court
has quoted an American Law Reports annotation which states:
Although the cases are not in accord, and decisions from the same
state do not always apply a uniform general rule, the numerical
weight of authority is to the effect that, if a person is killed in an
accident of which there are no eyewitnesses, evidence of his
habits is admissible as tending to throw light upon his probable
conduct at the time of the injury.46
Taking this statement of the majority rule- at its full value, the
testimony by E's fellow employees that E regularly ate his lunch
at his desk at 12:00 noon would be admissible.
E. THE "DEAD MAN'S STATUTE1"47
Whoever initiates a workmen's compensation death claim will
be considered the representative of the deceased employee, under
the dead man's statute,4 8 except possibly to the extent the issue
44 1 WIGMORE, o"p. cit. supra note 31, §§ 92-93; McComvncK, op. cit. supra
note 42, § 162.
45 Holberg v. McDonald, 137 Neb. 405, 289 N.W. 542 (1940).
46 Annot., 15 A.L.R. 125, 138 (1921), quoted in Peake v. Omaha Cold
Storage Co., 158 Neb. 676, 692, 64 N.W.2d 470, 480 (1954).
47 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1201 (Reissue 1956).
48 See Priest v. Business Men's Protective Ass'n, 117 Nob. 198, 205, 220
N.W. 255, 258 (1928): "The objection to the testimony ... seems to be
well taken. This testimony had to do with transactions and conversa-
tions with a deceased person, and the plaintiff [widow] is the repre-
sentative under the provisions of the workmen's' compensation act
permitting the claim for compensation to be made by the widow, next
of kin, or administrator of the estate." See also Coster v. Thompson
Hotel Co., 102 Neb. 585, 586, 168 N.W. 191, 192 (1918): "These sections,
construed together, seem to authorize recovery to be had by the de-
pendent or dependents themselves, their legal guardian or trustees,
the executors or administrator of the deceased, and, if no representa-
tive be qualified, the payment may be made 'to such persons as would
be appointed administrator of the estate of such decedent.' The statute
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 4
involves the plaintiff's personal standing to sue.49 It is likely
that in the hypothetical case, S, as the plant supervisor of the
corporate employer, is a "person having a direct legal interest"
under the dead man's statute and thereby incompetent to
testify as to any transactions or conversations with the employee.5 0
The testimony of corporate stockholders 5' and members of unin-
corporated associations 52 is incompetent under the statute. Simi-
lar reasoning would apply to the directors and high level man-
agerial personnel of corporations and associations. At some point,
however, it can be argued that a "mere agent" of a party is not
incompetent to testify.53 S is probably incompetent to testify
concerning his conversation with the deceased employee unless
the compensation claimant in some manner waives the statutory
bar. But E's fellow employees would not appear to be incom-
petent to testify under this rule.
is confusing upon its face and inconsistent, but it should be liberally
construed, and, if it is borne in mind that its object is to furnish
compensation to those dependent on the deceased for support, it does
not seem very important in whose name the action is brought, so long
as the relief is sure to reach the proper party." The statutory
language involved in this decision is still on the books. Compare
NFB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-124 and 48-143 (Reissue 1960) with NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 3665 and 3685 (1913). For similar reasons, whoever initiates
a -workmen's compensation death claim would be considered "the
personal representative of a deceased person" for purposes of waiving
the physician-patient privilege. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1207 (Supp.
1963).
49 Cf. Bourelle v. Soo-Crete, Inc., 165 Neb. 731, 87 N.W.2d 371 (1958)(issue whether widow was deceased's common law wife; ruling that
employer was not representative of deceased).
50 See Cashen, Practice and Procedure Before Nebraska Workmen's Com-
pensation Court, 41 NEB. L. REv. 151, 162 (1961); Pospishil, The "Dead
Man's Statute" in Nebraska, 31 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1951).
51 See, e.g., Tecumseh Nat'l Bank v. McGee, 61 Neb. 709, 724, 85 N.W.
949, 954 (1901): "An examination of the record discloses that the pur-
ported conversation was between the officers and stockholders of the
bank, on the one side, and the deceased on the other, in which different
ones took part, and as to the officers of the bank, all should be re-
garded as participants. Being stockholders and officers in the bank,
they had a legal interest in the action, and they were rendered incom-
petent to testify regarding such conversation."
52 Priest v. Business Men's Protective Ass'n, 117 Neb. 198, 220 N.W. 255
(1928).
53 Cf. Preferred Pictures Corp. v. Thompson, 170 Neb. 694, 698, 104 N.W.2d
57, 60 (1960) (permitting witness to testify as to conversations with
deceased agent of party): "Appellant was not incompetent to testify to
a conversation had by him and Weilepp, the deceased agent, because
appellee was not the representative of the deceased agent. A party
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F. UNmOR BusNEss RECORDS As EVIDENCE ACT54
It is highly questionable whether F's accident report, although
pursuant to an established reporting practice of the employer, is
a business record under the Nebraska interpretation of the Uniform
Act. Relying upon the leading decision in Palmer v. Hoffmani 5
the Nebraska court has refused to apply the statute to records of
descriptions of the acts of employees in carrying out their work.5 6
On the other hand, it can be argued that maintaining accident
records is an inherent requirement of the workmen's compensation
system and therefore a part of the regular course of the business
of covered employiers. Through experience ratings in the insur-
ance rates, the system intentionally encourages the improvement
to an action is not an incompetent witness by whom to prove a trans-
action or conversation with an agent of the other party since deceased.
.Stated differently: - 'Adverse party' as used in the statute does not
include agents or officers of 'adverse partyj" .Light v. Ash, 174 Neb.
627, 628, 119 N.W.2d 90, 91 (1963), noted in 43 NEB. L. REV. 641 (1964):
"The only criterion for determining the competency of a witness under
this statute is whether or not the witness will benefit from the result
of the case in which he seeks to testify ... Under these cases, the
interest of the witness in the result of the litigation, and not his rela-
tionship or status with interested parties, determined the question of
the competency of the witness to testify."
54 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-12,108 to -12,111 (Reissue 1956).
. 55 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943) (statement of engineer of train, deceased
before trial, to assistant superintendent of railroad and representative
of Utilities Commission two days after crossing accident was not made
"in the regular course of business" when offered as evidence in a tort
suit, since: "In short, it is manifest that in this case those reports are
not for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business.
Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of lading
and the like, these reports are calculated for use essentially in the
court, not in the business. Their primary utility is in litigating, not
in railroading."). See also Dilley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 327 F.2d
249 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 47 (1964) (required report
of foreman containing opinion as to cause of employee's death inad-
missible in Federal Employer's Liability Act action); United States
* v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators Inc., 304 F.2d 792 (2d
Cir. 1962) (statem&nt of employee to supervisor contained in super-
visor's required report held admissible business record in suit by
assignee of employee's personal injhry claim, but opinion indicated
*that the report would be inadmissible in the employee's suit for work-
men's compensation).
P6I-liggins v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170
'(1955) (memorandum in company files, prepared as a matter of per-
sonal' habit by department hda'd but without company's request or
requirement, stating that department head had met with other party
on a certain date, held inadmissible as a business record when offered
to prove company's good faith effort to negotiate with other party).
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of employee safety measures by employers and insurance com-
panies. An employer is required to submit a report to the com-
pensation court of all injuries occurring in the course of employ-
ment.57 This argument is only that an intra-company employee
accident report is capable of being a business record under the
Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act.5 8  It does not require
any special hearsay rule for compensation cases; only that the
accident reports can constitute business records. This also does
not require that the official report required to be submitted by
the employer to the compensation court be considered either as a
business record or an admission against interest.59 Assuming that
the statement of E to F is a spontaneous declaration by E and part
of the res gestae which F has promptly recorded,6 0 the intra-
company report could become a business record within the
Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act. Also, in an actual
case, notwithstanding the effect of previous limiting decisions,
there might be admissible evidence under the act in the records
of the doctor 6l or hospital.6 2
57 NEB. WouciREN's COMP. CT. R. VII: "In every case of injury occurring
in the course of employment whether resulting from accident or from
occupational disease, the employer shall file a report thereof with the
Compensation Court. Said report shall be filed immediately upon the
employer having knowledge of such injury." This rule was promul-
gated pursuant to NEB. RSV. STAT. §§ 48-144, 48-163, 48-165 (Reissue
1960). It conspicuously omits the statutory phrase "arising out of"
the employment.
58 For a forceful application of this type of reasoning to similar facts,
see Fagan v. City of Newark, 78 N.J. Super. 294, 188 A.2d 427 (1963).
59 Muff v. Brainard, 150 Neb. 650, 35 N.W.2d 597 (1949). See Seymour
v. Journal-Star Printing Co., 174 Neb. 150, 158-59, 116 N.W.2d 297,
302-03 (1962), overruling Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. Petersen, 127 Neb.
476, 256 N.W. 37 (1934). The form for the "First Report of Alleged
Accident or Occupational Disease" still states "All Alleged Accidents
Or Occupational Disease Cases Must Be Reported" and that "Filing
of This Report is Not an Admission of Liability Only a Report of the
Alleged Accident or Occupational Disease." NFB. WoRIWEN's ComP.
CT. R. VII. Neither would the death certificate be admissible as to
the cause of death. See O'Neil v. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 162 Neb.
284, 75 N.W.2d 739 (1956); Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 109 Neb. 526, 191
N.W. 691 (1922).
60 This assumption avoids the difficult question of "double" or "included"
hearsay under the Uniform Act with which the Nebraska cases have
not yet specifically dealt.
61 Cf. Fries v. Goldsby, 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d 171 (1956).
62 Cf. Anderson v. Evans, 164 Neb. 599, 83 N.W.2d 59 (1957).
